The Potential Role of Local Governments in Watershed Management by Tarlock, A. Dan
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 20
Issue 1 Symposium Edition Article 7
January 2003
The Potential Role of Local Governments in
Watershed Management
A. Dan Tarlock
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local Governments in Watershed Management , 20 Pace Envtl. L.
Rev. 149 (2003)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/7
The Potential Role of Local Governments in
Watershed Management
A. DAN TARLOCK*
The Search for a Local Government Role in
Environmental Protection
Protecting healthy watersheds and restoring degraded ones is
one of this country's major unmet environmental challenges. Be-
cause watersheds do not respect political boundaries, effective wa-
tershed conservation will require cooperation and coordination
among all levels of government, including local units. Watershed
conservation is one of the increasingly significant environmental
protection roles local governments are playing for a variety of rea-
sons, ranging from choice to coercion. Since the 1970s, many local
governments have expanded their traditional land use regulatory
programs to include environmental objectives such as impact as-
sessment1 and the protection of sensitive lands including flood
plains, wetlands and steep slopes. 2 Watershed protection is also a
logical extension of the increasing use of Habitat Conservation
Plans (HCPs) to comply with Endangered Species Act (ESA)3
mandates. HCPs have created partnerships among federal and
state environmental agencies and local governments to create
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Stan-
ford University. Professor John Nolon commissioned this paper for presentation at a
symposium on local environmental law sponsored by Pace University School of Law.
A mechanical failure on my flight to White Plains prevented my attendance at the
conference, and John Turner graciously both presented the paper and improved it by
his keen editorial skills.
1. Kathryn C. Plunkett, Local Environment Impact: Implementing and Improv-
ing the Process While Maintaining the Purpose, in NEW GROUND: THE ADVENT OF Lo-
CAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (John R. Nolon ed., forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter NEW
GROUND].
2. See generally John R. Nolon & Kristen Kelley, Local Environmental Law:
Natural Evolution or a Mutant Form? (pts. 1 & 2), 12 ENVTL. L. IN N.Y. 173 (2001), 12
ENVTL. L. IN N.Y. 191 (2001); John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of
Local Government Law, in NEW GROUND, supra note 1. For a discussion of the role of
tourism, second home concentration and retirement meccas in promoting sensitive
lands protection see FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., MANAGING TOURISM GROWTH: ISSUES
AND APPLICATIONS (1999).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
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multi-species habitat reserves to address environmental issues on
a larger geographic scale. 4 Washington State has adopted a Wa-
tershed Management Act5 to provide financial incentives and
guidelines for local governments that decide to develop a water-
shed management plan. However, the environmental role of local
governments is underdeveloped, compared to their federal and
state counterparts, because these units have not been assigned a
formal role in the implementation of the two major environmental
policies followed in this country, the reduction of exposure to
harmful pollutants and the conservation of biodiversity.
Local governments were not assigned a formal role in envi-
ronmental law and policy because the initial strategy was to feder-
alize environmental protection, to remedy grave, perceived defects
in state and local oversight. Federal superintendence was viewed
as the cure for fragmented jurisdictions and uneven regulation.
Early federal successes came from dealing with problems that
were largely interstate and involved common property resources
that had not been fully converted into exclusive private rights.
Airsheds and large rivers and lakes were relatively easy to im-
prove because the gross pollution was amenable to technological
fixes and polluters could not claim firm property rights to degrade
the resource. The case for federal intervention was, and remains,
strong, in part because local governments were slow to deal with
many environmental problems, and when they did exercise their
powers to define and prevent common law nuisances, the result
was often to shift pollution to other areas. As a result, environ-
mental policy continues to be primarily set and implemented at
the federal and state levels; ]local efforts consist of parallel but
often uncoordinated and fragmented initiatives to fill in non-
preempted gaps, such as noise and low level pollution nuisances,
left by federal and state programs. After federal land use plan-
ning legislation was defeated in the mid-1970s, 6 the federal gov-
4. See generally PIERCE COUNTY, WASHINGTON, ESA RESPONSE, EXECUTIVE SUM-
MARY (Mar. 16, 1999), available at http://www.salmoninfo.org/tricounty/piercesum-
mary.htm (detailing the role of a county in federal salmon restoration of the Pacific
Northwest).
5. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.82.005 - 90.82.902 (2003).
6. See Jerold S. Kayden, National Land-Use Planning in America: Something
Whose Time Has Never Come, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 445 (2000); John R. Nolon,
National Land Use Planning: Revisiting Senator Jackson's 1070 Policy Act, 48 LAND
USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (1996) (analyzing the reasons the federal government did not
complete the federalization of the third leg of the air, water, and land life support
system triangle).
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ernment left most land use regulation to the states;7 with
important exceptions, the states did not displace local authority.8
To deal with land-based pollution issues such as agricultural run-
off, the federal government threw some money at the states and
hoped that they could remedy the problem. But, as environmental
protection shifted to biodiversity conservation and nonpoint pollu-
tion canceled the gains achieved by controlling point sources of
pollution, the need to integrate land use controls into federal and
state environmental protection has become more pressing. More
generally, as environmental protection evolves from the first to
the second generation, characterized by the involvement of multi-
ple public and private actors whose choices large and small may
have adverse environmental impacts, local governments are be-
coming more direct participants. In addition, state land use ini-
tiatives, such as the current interest in smart growth,9 have many
potential biodiversity conservation and pollution control
implications.
This Article examines the potential roles for local government
in federal and state watershed protection initiatives designed both
to enhance pollution abatement and to conserve biodiversity.
Roughly defined, current watershed protection involves local pub-
lic and private collaboration to restore a degraded local watershed
and to protect smaller "at risk" rivers from land-based pollution so
as to promote water quality, biodiversity and greater safer public
use and enjoyment within the framework of existing federal and
state laws. 10 Watershed protection is a good case study for exam-
7. The restoration of lands damaged by surface mining is the major exception to
this statement. See 30 U.S.C. § 1255 (2000). Nonetheless, the current United States
Supreme Court views federal preemption of local regulation as a serious threat to
their rigid and artificial vision of constitutional federalism. See generally Solid Waste
Agency v. Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 174 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC].
8. See David Callies, The Quiet Revolution Redux: How Selected Local Govern-
ments Have Fared, in NEW GROUND, supra note 1 (surveying the current status of the
"Quiet Revolution" of state displacement of local government regulatory primacy).
9. See generally John R. Nolon, Local Land Use Controls That Achieve Smart
Growth, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11025 (2001); JOHN R. NOLON, WELL
GROUNDED: USING LOCAL LAND USE AUTHORITY TO ACHIEVE SMART GROWTH (2001);
Patricia E. Salkin, From Euclid to Growing Smart: The Transformation of the Ameri-
can Local Government Ethic into Land Use Controls, in NEW GROUND, supra note 1.
10. See DOUGLAS S. KENNEY ET AL., THE NEW WATERSHED SOURCE BOOK 5-12
(2000), available at http://www.colorado.edu/Law/NRLC/Publications/Watershed-
Chapters/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2003); DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, ARGUING ABOUT CONSEN-
SUS: EXAMINING THE CASE AGAINST WESTERN WATERSHED INITIATIVES AND OTHER
COLLABORATIVE GROUPS ACTIVE IN NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 1 (2000), avail-
able at http://www.colorado.edu/Law/NRLC/Publications/RR23.pdf (last visited Mar.
25, 2003).
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ining the reasons for an increased local government role as well as
both the promises of and constraints on such participation.
Increased watershed protection was identified during the
Clinton Administration as a major federal water pollution control
policy to supplement the application of technology standards to
point sources. To be successful, watershed protection programs
must necessarily involve affected units of local government. Wa-
tershed management is ultimately land use management, and
thus local governments have a potentially large role to play as the
primary public stewards of the nation's private land base. Neither
the federal nor state governments have the authority to order the
entire range of land use practices necessary to reduce nonpoint
sources of pollution and to conserve biodiversity." However, the
existing allocation of regulatory jurisdiction among the federal,
state, and local governments, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court's
anti-environmental jurisprudence, 12 impose serious constraints on
effective local government participation in watershed conserva-
tion. At the present time, coordinated, effective watershed man-
agement does not exist at any level of government. 13 It remains a
turbid vision, rather than a structural reality. Therefore, local
governments cannot fully control the fate of watersheds wholly or
partially within their jurisdiction, but they can still play a major
role in watershed protection through the exercise of the full scope
of land use authority and by cooperating with other vertical and
horizontal units of government, including Indian tribes.
This Article first briefly surveys the reasons for the current
interest in watershed protection. It then situates local watershed
protection and conservation initiatives in the broader context of
the downward devolution of environmental protection competence
that is now occurring. Nature abhors a vacuum, and the current
implosion of the national government' 4 (with respect to many
11. See Gregory A. Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A Critical Compari-
son of Legal Tools for Augmenting Streamflows in California, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3
(1996); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1997);
Symposium, Biodiversity & Its Effects On Private Property, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 3 (2002).
12. See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmen-
tal Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703 (2000), reprinted in 32 LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. REV. 227 (2001).
13. See Robert W. Adler & Michele Straube, Watersheds and the Integration of
U.S. Water Law and Policy: Bridging Great Divides, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'y REV. 1 (2000).
14. For an insightful and generally sympathetic examination of the reasons for
the implosion and the Supreme Court's inconsistent federalism jurisprudence see
ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2001).
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nondefense national security functions) creates greater opportu-
nities for states and their local government agents. The next sec-
tion examines selective options that local governments have to
protect sensitive lands and enhance watershed quality and to in-
corporate watershed protection goals into growth management
and smart growth programs. The final section examines the im-
pact of the Court's property rights protection jurisprudence on
these efforts.
The Revival of Interest in Watersheds as a Regulatory
Unit
The vision of the watershed as the "right" organizing unit for
integrated land and water resource management has fascinated
planners and resource managers for over 100 years and is once
more in vogue. Attempts to organize public policy on hydrologic
rather than political lines have a long and frustrating history in
the United States, rising and falling with the oscillations between
progressive and conservative dominance. For example, watershed
protection was the original rationale for the creation of the na-
tional forests, although the Court has refused to acknowledge this
legacy. 15 In the Progressive Conservation Era and again during
the New Deal, planners and reformers tried to use the river basin,
which included all of a system's watersheds, as the basis for com-
prehensive physical development and social progress. During the
New Deal, there were efforts to focus on the land use impacts of
federal development. 16 They were unsuccessful, as was another
attempt launched in the 1960s. For most of the 20th century, the
watershed was equated with large river basin boundaries. Re-
gional agencies such as the Tennessee Valley Authority sought to
address underdeveloped areas through dams and other large-scale
infrastructure projects, but most areas of the country rejected ef-
forts to reallocate the powers of both the states and local govern-
ments. The net result was a series of substantial federal projects
without a regional institutional infrastructure to manage for
changing needs.17 Thus, the integration of land and water use has
15. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (holding that U.S. For-
est Service enabling legislation does not create implied federal reserved water rights
for instream flows). J. Powell's opinion does full justice to the history.
16. See generally NAT'L RESOURCES COMM., THE REGIONAL FACTORS IN NATIONAL
PLANNING (1935).
17. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM: EXPLOR-
ING THE PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY 5-6 (2002).
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been token at best. The watershed or river basin idea was basi-
cally only a blueprint for the construction of an integrated system
of multipurpose dams on a large river system. This legacy is on
decreasing utility as we are now in the post-dam construction era
characterized by the reallocation of existing supplies for urban use
and environmental restoration.' 8
Integrated watershed management appeared to die with the
demise of the federal dam building era in the 1970s, but it has
been reborn as a grassroots movement consisting of a series of ex-
periments that range from public education to efforts to restore a
major ecosystem. 19 Three specific, related factors seem to drive
the re-emergence of the watershed as planning unit. The first fac-
tor is the search for alternatives to top-down federal water quality
standards, which do not take into account the special features of
individual watersheds. Federal standards have not effectively
limited nonpoint sources of pollution 20 and thus contribute to the
continued degradation of our watersheds. In addition, federal
water policy initiatives have reached a dead end and no new fed-
eral vision has been articulated. 21 While the Clinton Administra-
tion tried to promote watershed management as such a vision,22
neither the Administration nor the U.S. Congress provided the
necessary leadership or financial support.
The second factor is that states and local governments must
initiate new water policies and hope to interest Congress in sup-
porting them, as was the case with the Florida Everglades. 23 In
18. See A. Dan Tarlock, Water Policy Adrift, 16 F. FOR APPLIED POL'Y & RES. 63
(2001), available at http://forum.ra.utk.edu/Archives/Spring200l/tarlock.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 25, 2003); WORLD WATER VISION, A WATER SECURE WORLD: VISION FOR
WATER, LIFE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2000), available at http://watervision.cdinet.
com/commreport.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003); Peter H. Gleick, The Changing
Water Paradigm: A Look at Twenty-First Century Water Development, 25 WATER
INT'L 127 (2000), available at http://www.iwra.siu.edu/win/win2000/win03-00/gleick.
pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
19. See Douglas S. Kenney, Historical and Sociopolitical Context of the Western
Watersheds Movement, 35 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 493 (1999).
20. See Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program V: Aftershock and
Prelude, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,385 (2002).
21. For an incomplete effort to do so, hobbled by indifference and partisan politics,
see W. WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST: THE CHAL-
LENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY (1998), available at http://www.den.doi.gov/wwprac/
reports/final.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
22. See Unified Federal Policy for a Watershed Approach to Federal Land and
Resource Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 62,566 (Oct. 18, 2000).
23. See Mary Doyle, Implementing Everglades Restoration, 17 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 59 (2001); Mary Doyle & Donald V. Jodvey, Everglades Restoration: Forg-
ing New Law in Allocating Water for the Environment, 8 ENVTL. L. 255 (2002).
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general, Congress is no longer interested in regional water devel-
opment (except for a few specific-and often inefficient, and unco-
ordinated-"pork barrel" projects), and the major water agencies
have been severely limited by budget cuts. Executive leadership
of natural resources issues essentially ended in the Carter Admin-
istration. Finally, watershed management is also a manifestation
of the transition from the view that rivers are only commodities to
be exploited to the maximum extent possible to the ecological ideal
that the maintenance or restoration of the "natural" functions of
river systems, related ground waters 24 and their flood plains
should control development patterns .25
The net result is that current watershed management is no
longer the exercise in rational planning that it was during the era
of large dam construction. Occasionally, watershed management
is joined with efforts to develop placed-based sustainability strate-
gies, 26 but the current experiments often instead represent ad hoc
efforts to overcome the obstacles imposed by the current maze of
planning and regulatory programs rather than the creation of new
strategies. A U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) publi-
cation identified three common features of the watershed ap-
proach: (1) well-integrated partnerships; (2) a specific geographic
focus; and (3) action driven by environmental objectives and by
strong evidence.2 7
Section 303 of Clean Water Act (CWA)28 and the Safe Drink-
ing Water Act (SDWA)29 are the current "drivers" behind the wide-
spread interest in watershed planning. Section 303 requires that
EPA and the states set total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) for
streams that do not meet existing water quality standards after
the application of technology standards. TMDLs are, in effect, a
24. See Robert J. Glennon, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE
FATE OF AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS (2002).
25. Professor Ludwik A. Teclaff has been one of the leading advocates of the need
to recognize the benefits of historic flood cycles as well as the benefits of flood control.
See Ludwik A. Teclaff, Treaty Practice Relating to Transboundary Flooding, 31 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 109 (1991); Ludwik A. Teclaff, The Evolution of the River Basin Concept
in Natural and International Water Law, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 359 (1996); LUDWIK
A. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW (1967).
26. See SARAH F. BATES ET AL., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADWATERS: CHANGE AND
REDISCOVERY IN WESTERN WATER POLICY 186 (1993).
27. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR WATER-
QUALITY-BASED DECISIONS: THE TMDL PROCESS (1991), available at http://www.epa.
gov/OWOW/tmdl/decisions/ (Apr. 1991).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2000).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2000).
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total watershed waste load allocation among both point and
nonpoint 30 sources of pollution. The allocations require users to
impose additional land use controls for nonpoint sources of pollu-
tion, such as improved riparian corridor use practices, beyond
those required by the technology-forcing provisions of the Act.
TMDL implementation is scientifically and institutionally com-
plex and very costly.3 ' The fate of the program is uncertain, as
the George W. Bush EPA suspended the TMDL rules adopted at
the end of the Clinton Administration. 32 However, the watershed
conservation movement is broader than TMDL compliance. The
SDWA permits water suppliers to use land use controls to protect
watersheds, as New York City has so far successfully done, as an
alternative to costly filtration treatment.33
Why Now? Some of the Reasons For Increased Local
Government Participation in Environmental
Protection
At the highest level of abstraction, local governments are will-
ing or unwilling participants in a concerted effort to reduce the
centralization of political power that occurred during the rise of
the regulatory and welfare state in the late 19th and the first
three quarters of the 20th centuries in this and other countries.
Like tidal boundaries, the lines among different levels of jurisdic-
tional competence are always in flux, but the rate of change is be-
coming more intense. The merits of centralization versus
decentralization have been at the heart of political debates from
the beginning of the modern state, and ebb and flow in both direc-
tions.34 In the United States, from the progressive era, if not
before, to the "Great Society" of Lyndon B. Johnson, power was
increasingly centralized at the national level. Since the 1970s,
30. Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1346-47 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd sub
nom. Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that TMDLs may
include nonpoint sources); see generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ASSESSING THE
TMDL APPROACH TO WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT (2001); OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE
CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION (2d ed.
2002).
31. See Linda A. Malone, The Myths and Truths That Threaten the TMDL Pro-
gram, in NEW GROUND, supra note 1.
32. See Houck, supra note 20.
33. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-2(d) (2000).
34. One source of the roots of the modern debate can be found in the efforts of
political theorists in medieval Europe to come to terms with the failure of the Carolin-
gian Empire to reestablish a universal Roman Empire. See THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY
OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT c. 350-1450 (J.H. Burns ed., 1988).
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there have been powerful decentralization trends. The reasons for
these trends vary from the normative assertion that the U.S. Con-
stitution prefers state to national governance to more positive con-
cerns about the limits of centralized governance. The reasons
converge as the amount of federal dollars devoted to regulation as
opposed to wealth transfers has declined over time, further weak-
ening the federal government.
These larger trends have increasingly direct environmental
governance implications. 35 Watershed management is an impor-
tant manifestation of the force of decentralization for two compli-
mentary reasons: (1) the gradual "decentering" of environmental
law and (2) the long history of the argument that watersheds are
appropriate governance boundaries. It is also the product of a
growing rejection of two fundamental tenants of modern environ-
mentalism. First, modern environmentalism has long assumed
that "nature" exists only outside areas of human settlement, and
is a place in which humans are largely absent. Second, urban and
suburban areas are, therefore, not ecosystems worthy of conserva-
tion. As we realize that "nature" is a social construct and the
product of long interactions with human society, we are more will-
ing to see that "natural" systems such as watersheds still function
despite the heavy footprint of human settlement.36
THE DECENTERING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Units of local government were assigned no formal role in the
formulation of law and policy during the formative years of mod-
ern environmental law. The reason was straightforward. Envi-
ronmental protection represented the progressive evolution of
responsibility from lower to higher levels of government. Local
government's role in controlling nuisance-like activities such as
smoke pollution was recognized. However, local pollution ordi-
nances were lumped in the same category as state regulatory pro-
grams and common law nuisance actions as examples of
35. This statement is not confined to the United States. The identification of bi-
odiversity conservation as an international environmental law norm requires ways to
involve local communities in conservation efforts. See Gregory F. Maggio, Recogniz-
ing the Vital Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments for Con-
serving Biodiversity, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 179 (1997/1998).
36. For a lucid recent history of environmentalism that stresses the need to view
urban settlement as a component of an ecosystem see J. DONALD HUGHES, AN ENvI-
RONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD: HUMANKIND'S CHANGING ROLE IN THE COMMU-
NITY OF LIFE (2001). See also Nancy Perkins Spyke, Charm in the City: Thoughts on
Urban Ecosystem Management, 16 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 153 (2001).
15720021
9
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
piecemeal, ineffective strategies. Due to their political power,
states were assigned the role of federal implementation agents
and allowed to run federal and, parallel state programs as long as
they complied with federal floors. Local governments were effec-
tively either classified as polluters or left to deal with unambigu-
ously local nuisances such as noise. For example, the CWA is
directed primarily against industrial and publicly-owned treat-
ment plant outfalls. Much has changed since the heady early
1970s, and the cumulative impact of the continued evolution of
environmental protection has revived interest in an expanded role
for local units of government.
The environmental movement is slowly, if reluctantly, coming
to grips with the forces of "decentering." Environmentalism has
evolved from a quasi-guerilla political movement, premised on su-
ing bad public and private actors and on fostering federal regula-
tion, to a mature political movement. It has picked all the "low
hanging" fruit and must now deal with more difficult diffuse
problems that are increasingly less amenable to national solu-
tions. Three problems stand out, all of which suggest a greater
role for small units of government.
GRIDLOCK
Congress no longer seems able to formulate a national envi-
ronmental policy that enjoys a wide (but not universal) consensus.
This lack of consensus makes it both difficult to revise existing
programs and to formulate new ones. There are many reasons for
the standoff, ranging from the complexity of current problems,
many of which involve legitimate cost-benefit tradeoffs, to the lack
of creative new solutions beyond "federalize" and "enforce the let-
ter of the law" that command widespread respect, to the partisan
battles between proponents of rolling back or eliminating protec-
tion levels and staunch defenders of the status quo regardless of
its efficiency, effectiveness or necessity. Gridlock was in place
prior to September 11, 2001, but the focus on bioterrorism protec-
tion and other national security concerns will divert more atten-
tion from core environmental and other important social issues.
For better or worse, the existing gridlock has the real poten-
tial for increasing the power of local governments for the foresee-
able future, because it has the effect of accelerating the devolution
of power back to states and their subordinate units of government.
As national power weakens, tile federal government is forced to
[Vol. 20
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enlist local governments as partners in environmental protection,
as a way of addressing issues that Congress refuses to take up.
Devolution can take many forms. EPA's efforts to support the
development of local government environmental management sys-
tems, which include the design of more sustainable, compact and
green communities, is an example of "top-down" devolution.37
Other types of devolution, such as HCPs, are both "top-down" and
"bottom-up," and still other initiatives are more "bottom-up" and
result from a desire on part of those with the greatest stake in a
resource to control its future use by influencing the application of
federal and state standards.
THERE IS No RACE TO THE BOTTOM
Much of federal environmental law is premised on the need to
maintain federal floors to prevent a race to the bottom. In recent
years, scholars have mounted strong theoretical attacks against
the existence of the race while others point to the persistent
under-enforcement of environmental laws. The debate waxes furi-
ous.3 8 For example, some agree that the theory may be sound, but
in reality the states and federal government are now in a joint
race to the bottom. The debate cannot be easily resolved, but for
my purpose the important point is that its existence reflects the
reality that the role of the state governments has changed drasti-
cally-if unevenly-since the early days of the environmental
movement when northern states imposed high federal standards
on their southern brethren to prevent them from competing with
low pollution standards as they had previously with anti-union
laws. States have subsequently invested more money in environ-
mental protection and not all innovation now comes from Wash-
ington. As states mature, opportunities for local governments to
play a more important role in environmental regulation also
increase.
37. See John Vorhees, The Changing Environmental Management Scene: Federal
Policy Impacts the Private and Public Sectors, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10079, 10091-94 (Jan. 2001).
38. Professor Richard L. Revesz is the leading critic of the race-to-the-bottom the-
ory. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public
Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 555 (2001). See also Jonathan H. Adler, Let 50
Flowers Bloom: Transforming the States Into Laboratories of Environmental Policy,
31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11284 (Nov. 2001). But see Clifford Rechtschaffen,
Competing Visions: EPA and the States Battle for the Future of Environmental En-
forcement, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10803 (Dec. 2000).
20021 159
11
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
IT'S LAND USE, STUPID
As Aldo Leopold taught,39 land is the most important part of
the biotic pyramid. But, Leopold has been more read than ap-
plied. The initial federal successes came from dealing with gross
air and water pollution. Land was, and is, a different story. Effec-
tive land conservation requires active management, not just the
installation of technology to treat emissions and effluents. 40 It is
also much more difficult to develop uniform environmental stan-
dards for land, compared to air and water pollution. 41
Nondegradation is seldom an option. After federal land use plan-
ning legislation was defeated in the mid-1970s, the federal gov-
ernment left land use regulation to the states. However, as
environmental protection shifts from an almost exclusive empha-
sis on pollution abatement and prevention to include biodiversity
conservation, it is no longer possible to ignore land use issues.
Nonfederal land is difficult for the federal government to reg-
ulate. The federal government faces the double problem that it
does not control nonpublic lands and private property rights are
firmly entrenched. The common law gives entitlement holders the
right to exploit land up to the point that it becomes an actionable
nuisance or trespass, and the Court has adopted the common law
baseline as a limitation on the state's power to regulate under the
Fifth Amendment. 42 In addition to the takings problem, the Com-
merce Clause43 may limit the federal government's power to regu-
late historic local activities. Until United States v. Lopez44 and
United States v. Morrison,45 it was assumed that the commerce
power gave the federal government the ability to regulate land use
if the cumulative impact of state and local practices were inconsis-
tent with a federal objective.46 The current Court has revived the
39. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE
(1949) [hereinafter SAND COUNTY ALMANAC].
40. For a fascinating account of the New Deal's largely failed effort to develop
land use policies based on the natural carrying capacity of the ecosystem see DONALD
WORSTER, DUST BOWL: THE SOUTHERN PLAINS IN THE 1930s (1979).
41. Scientists are now struggling to develop similar land use standards. For an
important effort see V.H. Dale et al., Ecological Principles and Guidelines for Manag-
ing the Use of Land, 10 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 639 (2000).
42. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022 (1992); Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629 (2001).
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
44. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
45. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
46. See William Funk, The Court, the Clean Water Act, and the Constitution:
SWANCC and Beyond, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10741 (July 2001).
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long ignored local-national distinction, and it is possible that the
Court will hold that the nexus between a land use 47 and interstate
commerce is too weak to support federal regulation. 48
Legal Barriers to Effective Watershed Management
Local governments, of course, occupy parts of watersheds, but
they face formidable barriers in trying to adapt their land use and
related powers to watershed governance. Local governments are
locked into the jurisdictional "box" that state boundary laws draw,
and it seems virtually impossible to break out of that constraint. 49
Local control may not extend to crucial components of the water-
shed, water flows, and in watersheds where there is substantial
state and federal public land, local governments must use indirect
rather than direct land use controls. 50 Three major barriers to lo-
cal governance are outlined in the following section.
THERE IS NO THERE THERE
The first barrier is the concept of watershed itself. It is a
term with no precise definition and few legal consequences. It is
not a political and management unit except for the limited pur-
pose of special districts, 51 and its inherent elasticity makes it diffi-
47. Cf. SWANCC, supra note 7 (noting that risk of interference with local land use
control was relevant factor in deciding that CWA does not give Corps of Engineers the
power to regulate isolated wetlands used by migratory birds).
48. Courts have not, however, invalidated federal environmental laws such as the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000), that regulate local land use
activities. E.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat'l Ass'n of Home
Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See Adrian Vermeule, Centraliza-
tion and the Commerce Clause, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11334 (Nov. 2001);
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Curious Flight of the Migratory Bird Rule, 31 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 11079 (Sept. 2001).
49. Mamaroneck, New York's adoption of an "innovative" extra-territorial zoning
review ordinance to try to block an IKEA store in a neighbouring community illus-
trates just how tight the "box" is. City of New Rochelle v. Town of Mamaroneck, 111
F. Supp. 2d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
50. States have the power to regulate the environmental aspects of private activi-
ties on federal land see Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987),
but they have no direct land use authority. However, local governments are becoming
more aggressive in finding ways to regulate the use of adjacent public land. Washoe
County, Nevada recently voted, pursuant to the Mining Act of 1872, to deny a special
use permit for a planned cat litter clay processing plant that would have been located
on private land.
51. Nonetheless, Professor J.B. Ruhl argues that the watershed is a superior con-
cept to the ecosystem because "we can define boundaries and sub-boundaries and the
flow across each with some reasonable degree of precision." J.B. Ruhl, The (Political)
Science of Watershed Management in the Ecosystem Age, 35 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES
ASS'N 519, 522 (1998).
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cult to use as a tool for coordinating existing political boundaries
not drawn along hydrographic lines. Watersheds are not func-
tional planning units. Unlike countries such as Australia that
have rigorous, integrated catchment planning processes, 52 the
United States has no uniform, formal watershed planning mecha-
nism to provide a framework for land and water management and
to include a landscape conservation component into individual
property rights. Watershed resources 53 include both the lands
and waters within a defined ecological unit, but no consensus ex-
ists about the boundaries of such units or the proper allocation of
control authority.5 4
The existence of a watershed does not lead to a limitation on
the use of property except in water law, where water use restric-
tions are defined situationally.5 5 Outside of water law, property
rights are generally not defined in relation to a specific geographic
location because they are considered abstract universal relation-
ships good across time and space. The vagueness of the term con-
tributes to its lack of legal meaning. For example, the terms
"watershed" and "river basin" continue to be used indiscrimi-
nately, although "watershed" usually now refers to the catchment
or drainage area of an individual stream or river and the older
planning term, "river basin," properly refers to the drainage area
of a large river and its tributaries. But the scale of current water-
shed restoration can be large. For example, the preservation of
the Florida Everglades requires that the entire watershed be
managed to prevent their continuing degradation. 56
THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS DETACHES LAND FROM WATER AND
PREEMPTS MOST LocAL CONTROL
Watershed management inevitably requires control over the
flow of water in the area as well as the prevention of land-based
pollution. The law of water rights presents two problems for local
52. DAVID FARRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 89-91 (2d ed. 1993).
53. See George Coggins, Watershed as a Public Natural Resource on the Federal
Lands, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1991).
54. See Robert W. Adler, Fresh Water-Toward a Sustainable Future, 32 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10167 (Feb. 2002); Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Wa-
tershed Protection, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 973, 1088-94 (1995).
55. See, e.g., Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 88 P. 978, 980 (Cal. 1907) (hold-
ing that use which does not return water to downstream users violates rule that ripa-
rian rights are limited to uses within a watershed).
56. Thomas H. Ankersen & Richard Hamann, Ecosystem Management and the
Everglades: A Legal and Institutional' Analysis, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 473
(1996).
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governments. First, water has been detached from the watershed
of origin and the ecosystems in the watershed, both conceptually
and physically. Thus, there are many watersheds for which there
are inadequately defined water rights. Second, cities have com-
paratively little leverage over the allocation of water within their
boundaries because water allocation is a state, rather than local,
function.
Science began the detachment of water from the watershed,
but law was ready to follow. Hydrology was developed as the sci-
ence of river manipulation;57 dissenting geographers concerned
with possible adverse effects of the relationship between ecosys-
tem vitality and unmodified river behavior were relegated to a
marginal status. The common law of riparian rights was origi-
nally a law of limited nonconsumptive use by those within a wa-
tershed, but the law has gradually eroded the connection between
humans and actual physical space. In the United States, both
land and water resources have been viewed as commodities, 58 and
this has allowed the law to "detach" rivers from their surrounding
ecosystems. When mill power and navigation were the principal
water users, the natural flow was the most important component
of the resource. This changed in the mid-19th century, and the
supply available for storage and diversion became the most impor-
tant component. Today, it has proven very difficult to integrate
instream flow rights into the common law of riparian rights, regu-
lated riparianism and prior appropriation. 59 Both science and law
have contributed to the "detachment" of rivers from their
watersheds.
Water law was largely transformed from a watershed conser-
vation focus to one that viewed the watershed as an "area of ori-
gin"-a source for more distant urban and agricultural demands.
Rights were assigned to individuals and thus, in the 19th and
57. WATER SCI. & TECH. BD., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OPPORTUNITIES IN THE
HYDROLOGIC SCIENCES 38-43 (1991).
58. The influence of western European law and economic theory on the perception
of all land and related resources as commodities from the time of settlement has been
brilliantly explored by the environmental historian William Cronon in two books,
CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND
(1983) and NATURE'S METROPOLIS (1991). The adverse consequences of the "coin-
modification" of nature is, of course, the central theme of modern environmentalism.
See Lester W. Milbrath, The World is Relearning Its Story About How It Works, in
ENVIRONMENTAL. POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA: MOVEMENTS, PARTIES, OR-
GANIZATIONS AND POLICY 21 (Sheldon Kamienecki ed., 1993).
59. See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 343-57 (5th ed.
2002).
2002] 163
15
164 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
20th centuries, water law contributed to unintegrated watershed
management by removing the river's natural behavior or hydrog-
raphy as a constraint on watershed development. Both prior ap-
propriation and the more watershed-friendly common law of
riparian rights permitted water to be removed from the watershed
of origin and transported to areas of higher demand for consump-
tive use. Local governments willingly participated in the decon-
struction. For example, in the Midwest states, drainage districts
were formed to support the conversion of land to agriculture and
sustain crop production.60
Water allocation is an exclusive state function because we
view water law as a branch of property and tort law. Water law
regulates relationships between persons and things, and the as-
sumption is that we should strive for simplicity6 l and uniformity.
Property rights are abstract universal relationships good across
space and time.62 Not only do local units of government lack di-
rect control of waters within their borders, another legacy of the
19th and 20th century centralization of water is the assumption
that state regulation preempts indirect as well as direct local con-
trol because it is a matter of statewide concern. 63 Preemption,
which can be express or implied, is a function of two major factors,
intent and statewide impact. The first is the intent of the legisla-
ture. Since local governments have no inherent powers, states are
free to displace local authority. For example, an intermediate
New Jersey appellate court has held that the state's amended
Right to Farm Act6 4 preempts local regulation of runoff.65 Second,
courts examine the impact of local control on state interests. Pre-
emption can be found when the legislature has not clearly exer-
cised its power to displace local governments. Courts have
developed independent tests, similar to the judicial creation of the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, to preserve state autonomy
60. See JACOB BEUSCHER, WATER RIGHTS 77-8 (1967).
61. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
62. For a lucid criticism of the post-17th century theory of property see Robert J.
Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and
Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347 (1998).
63. See generally Snow v. Abalos, 140 P. 1044 (N.M. 1914); FRANK MICHELMAN &
TERRENCE SANDALOW MATERIALS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 314 (1970).
64. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:IC-1-10 (West 2001).
65. Township of Franklin v. Hollander, 769 A.2d 427, 437-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001).
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in matters of statewide concern and can conclude that a specific
land use regulation is inconsistent with a state law.
Local governments also lack direct control over water quality
standards. They must meet, but not set, them. The limited posi-
tion of local governments can be contrasted with Indian tribes,
which often hold small land masses within the boundaries of a
state. Indian tribes can use the CWA to protect their watersheds
against upstream pollution.66 Section 505 of the CWA allows
tribes to adopt more stringent water quality standards than those
required by EPA or the state in which the reservation is located.
For example, a Rio Grande River Pueblo, located below the city of
Albuquerque, adopted-and EPA approved-a more stringent
sewage discharge requirement for arsenic than New Mexico's by
classifying its portion of the river for ceremonial use and applied
the heightened standard against the upstream city. The federal
courts of appeals have held that tribes have the same power as
states to adopt more stringent water quality standards, and thus
EPA has the authority under section 510 of the CWA to approve
these standards.67 Tribal exercise of CWA powers is often seen as
detrimental to local interests, but their power to set and enforce
water quality standards makes them an important partner in co-
operative watershed management.
WATER AND LAND USE WERE NOT LINKED
Integrated water management requires control over both land
and water resources, but local governments often lack either. For
example, watershed protection can be a major component of local
and regional growth management and smart growth strategies,
but until recently there was no integration of water and land use
planning except through public utility law and state and federal
water development policy. Water is easy to remove from water-
sheds because cities enjoy a super-preference for water and this
preference, along with the assumed public utility duty to antici-
pate future growth and acquire the necessary supplies to serve it
have made it easy for cities to acquire the necessary water rights
to anticipate future growth. The net result is that municipal law
66. See generally Joe W. Stuckey, Tribal Nations: Environmentally More Sover-
eign Than States, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11198 (Oct. 2001).
67. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733, 739-40 (D.N.M. 1993),
affd, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996); Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (9th Cir.
1998).
2002]
17
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
and the land use policy of competition for high tax low service uses
do not promote watershed conservation. 68
Stewardship of Private Land: The Basis of Local
Watershed Conservation
Local government's greatest contribution to watershed con-
servation is the control of private land. This oversight, however,
is piecemeal. Cities and counties often lack jurisdiction over other
parts of the watershed held by private entities, and the net impact
of the Court's taking jurisprudence is to chill local regulatory ini-
tiatives. To complicate matters, in areas in which much of the wa-
tershed lies on public lands, permitted activities such as oil and
gas drilling, grazing, and logging may create adverse impacts, but
local governments have at best an indirect voice in their
regulation.6 9
Watershed conservation initiatives are also difficult because
local governments have traditionally limited their land use pow-
ers to nuisance prevention, the financing and coordination of ur-
ban services, and the density,, timing, and distribution of growth,
although their powers are not limited to these objectives. These
governments are the primary stewards of sensitive lands, and
they have considerable power over them. 70 Environmental sensi-
tivity is a legitimate factor to be taken into account in a district
classification. Local zoning can be used to create narrow river cor-
ridor vegetation preservation bands to buffer the river from per-
mitted development and protect stream quality.71 Courts have
generally accepted environmental protection, including watershed
protection, 72 as a legitimate basis for regulation, but sensitive
68. See supra notes 59-62 for a brief discussion of efforts to integrate water and
land use planning.
69. See supra note 50 for an example of a community's successful effort to circum-
vent this constraint.
70. I have addressed the authority issue at greater length in A. Dan Tarlock, Lo-
cal Government Protection of Biodiversity: What is Its Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555,
574-86 (1993).
71. Dail v. York County, 528 S.E.2d 447, 452 (Va. 2000).
72. E.g., Star Vector Corp. v. Town of Windham, 776 A.2d 138, 141-42 (N.H. 2001)
(holding that town could deny a site plan for an indoor shooting range due in part to
concerns about escape of hazardous substances into watershed); City of Alpharetta v.
Estate of C.R. Sims, 533 S.E.2d 692, 694 (Ga. 2000) (holding that special use permit
was properly denied because landowner failed to demonstrate that he had taken rea-
sonable steps to preserve trees).
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land use regulation continues to raise ultra vires issues.7 3 For ex-
ample, some states have designated specific areas of critical envi-
ronmental concern, such as the New Jersey pinelands and Lake
Michigan sand dunes 74. Other states have a general process to
designate environmentally sensitive areas,75 and watersheds are
prime critical areas. California and Nevada have created a bi-
state planning commission to try and stem the pollution of Lake
Tahoe that has resulted from intensive land development in the
area. Virginia and Maryland require that local governments
adopt land use regulations to limit runoff from the Chesapeake
Bay watershed.7 6 These include the delineation of resource pro-
tection and management areas, the designation of development
concentration areas, and vegetation cover requirements. 77
In addition to ultra vires challenges, preemption is always a
threat to local watershed regulation, but there are many creative
opportunities for local governments to "thread the needle" by en-
acting complementary rather than conflicting regulation. A Vir-
ginia court, for example, has held that a state law that preempts
local governments from prohibiting silviculture operations does
not preclude local review of harvest plans and the imposition of
stream buffer requirements. 78 The Colorado Supreme Court has
held that a county wetland protection ordinance, which made it
impossible to site a transbasin diversion facility, was not an inter-
ference with the right to appropriate but rather a permissible reg-
ulation of land use. 79 An intermediate California appellate court
73. E.g., City of Newark v. Township of Hardyston, 667 A.2d 193, 198 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. 1995); In re Kisiel, 772 A.2d 135 (Vt. 2000) (holding that town plan prohibi-
tion on development on "steep slopes" an insufficient basis for denial of permit). In
reviewing a moratorium on land development in a municipal watershed, the New
Jersey court noted:
The Legislature is still wrestling with the problem of watershed protec-
tion. The issue is politically sensitive because it is a matter of general
concern (protection of watershed land and water sources) against both the
property rights of watershed owners and the taxing interests of municipal
entities ... the fact that no easy resolution has occurred is neither a sur-
prise nor a sign that the moratorium was meant to expire.
City of Newark v. Township of Hardyston, 667 A.2d 193, 198 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
1995).
74. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 324.63702 (West 2001).
75. E.g., Fla. Envtl. Land & Water Mgmt. Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. chs. 380.012 -
380.12 (2001).
76. See LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE § 13 (1990).
77. Id.
78. Dail v. York County, 528 S.E.2d 447, 450-51 (Va. 2000).
79. City of Colorado Springs v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 895 P.2d 1105, 1116 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1008 (1995).
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held that the long history of the state's failure to regulate ground-
water pumping allowed counties to pass anti-export ordinances.8 0
As water supply options narrow in many parts of the county,
local governments are beginning to link land use and water plan-
ning, and these efforts have considerable potential to promote wa-
tershed conservation. The integration of land use and water
supply planning will not stop much growth,8 ' but the potential for
watershed conservation is increased because the link will: (1) re-
quire cities to review more carefully development that threatens
to adversely affect the environmental values of a river corridor or
watershed; (2) require some cities to limit the rate of growth to
match available, secure long-term supplies; (3) possibly require
some cities in arid areas to realize that the carrying capacity of
local and more distant watersheds to support urban growth is in
fact limited; and (4) create additional pressures for more aggres-
sive water conservation and efficient use that may indirectly con-
serve instream flows. Public, utility law is adjusting to the new
era of more limited water supplies by recognizing that suppliers
have more discretion to match service with supply.8 2 Modern stat-
utes are rapidly eroding the assumption that there is an absolute
duty to serve. Cities may subordinate service obligations to land
use plans and policies.8 3 At a minimum, cities may delay land de-
velopment and thus take pressure off of at-risk watersheds, until
adequate water supplies and sewage systems are available.8 4
Other states are beginning to follow Arizona's lead in linking
water supply planning and urban growth. For example, a 2001
California law requires that all new developments over 500 units
demonstrate a firm long-term supply, taking into account drought
conditions.8 5
80. Baldwin v. County of Tehema, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 892-93 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994).
81. PETER D. NICHOLS, ET AL., WATER AND GROWTH IN COLORADO: A REVIEW OF
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES FACING THE WATER MANAGEMENT COMMUNITY (2001).
82. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES §5.13[b] (1988);
see generally Dennis J. Hermann, Sometimes There Is Nothing Left Give: The Justifi-
cation for Denying Water Service to New Consumers to Control Growth, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 429 (1992).
83. E.g., County of Del Norte v. Crescent City, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179, 186-87 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999).
84. Schofield v. Spokane County, 980 P.2d 277, 281 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (hold-
ing Washington County has the power to deny rezoning for riparian land because of
an inadequate sewage system).
85. CAL. GOVT CODE § 66473.7 (West 2003); see A. Dan Tarlock & Lora A. Lucero,
Connecting Land, Water, and Growth, 54 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (2002).
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The Court's Takings Jurisprudence and Watershed
Conservation
Many of the major causes of watershed degradation stem
from unsustainable land uses within the watershed, regulations
which control the uses of sensitive land must be consistent with
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, analogous provisions in
state constitutions, and takings legislation in place in states such
as Florida and Texas.8 6 These measures potentially chill water-
shed conservation because they are widely perceived as a reflec-
tion of the principle that land use law has always promoted
settlement and intensive development. This legacy constitutes
the largest legal barrier to the protection of watersheds, because it
fuels the current Court's takings jurisprudence. All land use regu-
lation, especially with regard to the protection of sensitive lands,
disturbs deep-seated political and legal expectations of easy and
rapid land conversion, and the expectation of the "right to convert"
is protected by the constitutional guarantee that property will not
be "taken" without compensation. Land is a form of exclusive pri-
vate property. The Court has pronounced that land is the highest
form of private property8 7 and has displayed increasing hostility
to the idea that the state can regulate the use of land to protect
biodiversity without payment of compensation.
This hostility to biodiversity protection is captured in the
Court's 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil.88 Lucas held that a state beachfront setback line imposed to
protect beachfront dwellings from collapsing due to erosion was an
unconstitutional taking of the owner's property because it virtu-
ally destroyed the development value of the lot.8 9 There are now
three major issues in takings law: (1) what percentage of the
value of the property can a regulation diminish?; (2) when is a
taking regulatory versus per se physical?; and (3) what is the rele-
vance of the existence of a regulation? The most far-reaching as-
pect of Lucas, not diminished by the subsequent takings
jurisprudence, is the suggestion that a regulation that has a sub-
86. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (West 2001); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2007 (Vernon
2000).
87. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992). My col-
league Fred Bosselman has shown that the framers rejected the argument that land
should be a preferred form of property. Fred Bosselman, Land as a Privileged Form of
Property, in TAKINGS: LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AF-
TER DOLAN AND LucAs 29 (David E. Callies ed., 1996).
88. 505 U.S. 1003.
89. Id. at 1031-32.
20021
21
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
stantial economic impact may only be justified if the limitation
inheres "in the title itself, in the restrictions that the background
principles of the state's law of property and nuisance already place
on land ownership.. .."9 Lucas did, however, suggest that a prop-
erty owner cannot claim that a government regulation constitutes
a taking if the regulation codifies "background principles" of nui-
sance and property law, although it is clear that Justice Antonin
Scalia did not intend it as a widely available justification for se-
vere regulations. 91 The Court has subsequently held that the ex-
istence of prior regulation is not a per se defense to a taking
challenge; it is only a factor to be considered in calculating the
claimant's investment-backed expectations.92
Common law-based background limitations reflect the idea
that property is a legal construct, which has historically reflected
both public and private interests, 93 and thus the Constitution per-
mits the state to define the scope of the noncompensable use by
providing property owners with adequate notice of the nonrecogni-
tion of a claim. These background limitations can support more
intensive regulation of watershed resources such as wetlands and
riparian corridors that have long been subject to judicial and ad-
ministrative control.94 A federalist reading of the Lucas qualifica-
tion would afford substantial deference to state law to define the
background conditions 95 and would support a less uni-dimen-
sional conception of property than is currently reflected in the
90. Id. at 1029; see David L. Callies, Custom and Public Trust? Background
Principles of State Property Law?, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10003 (Jan.
2000).
91. This doctrine has, in fact, long been part of the common law. See Otis Co. v.
Ludlow Mfg. Co., 201 U.S. 140, 152 (1906) (noting the mill dam act in force since 1714,
which allowed downstream riparians to flood upper upon payment of damages, "en-
ters as an incident into the nature of property ..."). See generally Louise Halper,
Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89 (1998).
92. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629-30 (2001).
93. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1252 (1996); John F. Hart, Land Use in the Early
Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099
(2000).
94. See Fred Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands of Common
Law, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247 (1996) (discussing common law roots of wetlands
regulation).
95. Professor Frank I. Michelman has lucidly pointed out the tension in Lucas
between the desire to expand the scope of regulatory takings and the Court's respect
for "our federalism." Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence:
A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301 (1993).
But see Robert M. Washburn. Land Use Control, The Individual, and Society: Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 52 MD. L. REV. 162 (1993).
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Court's jurisprudence.96 A federalist approach to the definition of
property rights would not compel the adoption of an ecological
concept of property, nor would it incorporate an ecosystem support
limitation into the right,97 but it would permit states to integrate
this approach into takings law.98
Lucas categorically disdains this approach, but despite Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion, two contradictory trends are taking place in
takings law. The first seeks to codify the restrictive tests of Lucas
and impose extra-constitutional compensation burdens on states.
In effect, states would have to pay to protect the environment.
Several states have passed property rights legislation. Such legis-
lation either requires some form of property rights impact assess-
ment, modelled on environmental impact assessment, or contains
a substantive standard-beyond that required by federal and
state constitutions-to determine when a landowner is entitled to
compensation. For example, the Florida Property Rights Act enti-
tles an owner to compensation if a regulation inordinately bur-
dens his land or he "bears permanently a disproportionate share
of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness
should be borne by the public at large."99
The second trend tries to seek to protect biologically sensitive
lands such as wetlands and endangered species habitats by
preventing development within the confines of the Court's takings
framework. These efforts mix regulation with both compensated
and uncompensated land acquisition. Habitat Conservation Plans
(HCPs) adopted to implement Endangered Species Act duties, for
example, allow development in return for the dedication of land or
the payment of fees to mitigate the adverse effects of the project or
by providing substitute forms of compensation. Land dedication
96. The argument that no single "land ethic" is adequate to define property for
Fifth Amendment purposes is brilliantly developed in Fred Bosselman, Four Land
Ethics: Order, Reform, Responsibility, Opportunity, 24 ENVTL. L. 1439 (1994); see also
the exchange between Professors Richard Epstein and Frank Michelman. Richard A.
Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of Pruneyard v. Robins, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 21 (1997); Frank I. Michelman, The Common Law Baseline and Restitu-
tion for Lost Commons: A Reply to Professor Epstein, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 57 (1997).
97. The foundation of an ecological definition is A SAND CouNTY ALMANAC, supra
note 39. Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993) (sketching a
concept of property as a usufruct rather than an exclusive right to maximization ex-
ploitation). See also Eric Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1269 (1993); Eric Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 77 (1995).
98. See Michelman, supra note 95.
99. FLA. STAT. ch. 70.001(3)(e) (1995).
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and carefully regulated mitigation can be powerful watershed con-
servation instruments because properly calculated impact fees can
be used to mitigate the biodiversity loss of development by includ-
ing the conservation of watersheds and riparian corridors. All ex-
actions must meet the nexujs and rough proportionality test of
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission'00 and Dolan v. City of
Tigard'0 1. Cities bear the burden of demonstrating that they have
accurately used available scientific information to construct a ra-
tio between the amount of habitat destroyed by development and
the amount that must be dedicated to a permanent reserve
through acquisition or restoration. 10 2 Nollan-Dolan fees can per-
form these functions, but only if cities do their homework.10 3
A federal district court decision, National Wildlife Federation
v. Babbitt,0 4 illustrates the need to do a full Nollan-Dolan analy-
sis before imposing an impact fee. California is an endangered
species "hot spot," and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
and various governmental units negotiated an ambitious regional
HCP for a 53,000 acre, relatively undeveloped flood plain near
Sacramento.10 5 The Notomas Basin Conservancy assembled sev-
eral connected blocks of land funded by development fees. The
pay-off for the plan was the Fish and Wildlife Service's issuance of
a biological opinion that authorized the issuance of "incidental
take" permits to several local governments and water districts. 06
To induce sufficient developer and local community support,
HCPs have to balance front-end development opportunities, which
are immunized from an ESA § 9 taking suit, with the implementa-
tion of a multi-species conservation plan that has a reasonable
probability of success over a long period of time. The trick is to
find an "acceptable minimum level" of habitat destruction and
consequent species decline. To do this, the plan has to make cru-
cial risk assumptions in the face of multiple levels of scientific and
100. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
101. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
102. See Michael Allen Wolf, Earning Deference: Reflections on the Merger of Envi-
ronmental and Land Use Law, in NEw GROUND, supra note 1.
103. See Fred Bosselman, Dolan Works, in TAKINGS SIDES ON TAKING ISSUES: PUB-
LIC AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVE 345 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002). For an important
empirical analysis that shows that many California cities have increased impact fees
as a result of Nollan-Dolan see Anne E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Taking on the
Ground: How the Supreme Court's Takings Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use
Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 103 (2001).
104. 128 F. Supp 2d 1274, 1278-79 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
105. Id. at 1278-79.
106. Id.
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institutional uncertainty. The Notomas Basin plan's crucial as-
sumptions were that only about a third of the basin would in fact
be developed, and that future threats to the species' continued
survival as development took place around the reserve system
could be minimized through aggressive adaptive management.
HCP risk-based regulation applies the precautionary principle, as
developed in toxic pollutant regulation, to biodiversity conserva-
tion. The National Wildlife Federation court recognized the need
for precaution and did not invalidate the key scientific risk as-
sumptions behind the plan. All HCPs are experiments and all
stakeholders must accept a relatively high level of uncertainty.
The Court did, however, zero in on the weakest deals, which posed
an unreasonable risk of the HCP's failure and demonstrated the
disconnect between the regional plan, the lack of regional respon-
sibility, and the Department of Interior's (DOI's) inability to nail
down adequate funding 10 7 prior to the issuance of the incidental
take permit. It invalidated the FWS's conclusion that the amount
of the mitigation fee would be sufficient to acquire the necessary
habitat, because it was unsupported by substantial evidence and
therefore arbitrary. Administrative law purists may object to
combining an adjudicative and rulemaking or informal decision
standard, but the court in effect enforced the Court's Nollan-Do-
lan standard. Nollan-Dolan requires that land exactions be based
on a reasonable showing of need and that the exaction is propor-
tionate to the environmental degradation generated by the land
use activity. By failing to demonstrate compliance with the stan-
dard, the DOI may have over- or under-estimated the necessary
level of exaction.
Watershed protection may be facilitated in many states be-
cause their courts have been increasingly receptive to the use of
regulation to protect sensitive lands. These courts have held that
the right to create an environmental hazard is not constitutionally
protected, or have reasoned that substitute compensation schemes
effectively avoid a taking. For example, the Colorado Supreme
Court has held that the enforcement of state radiation control reg-
ulations against a mill site with uranium tailings was not a taking
because no investment-backed expectations were frustrated. 0 8
107. See John Kostyack, NWF v. Babbitt: Victory for Smart Growth and Imperiled
Wildlife, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10712 (2001); see generally William Rod-
gers, The Myth of Win-Win: Misdiagnosis in the Business of Reassembling Nature, 42
ARiz. L. REV. 297 (2000).
108. Colo. Dep't of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1002 (Colo. 1994).
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"The Mill was 'on notice' that the radioactive materials present on
the property were dangerous and highly regulated at both the
state and federal level as was the use of the property itself."'10 9
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court remanded a takings
claim to determine if a city can prevent the development of littoral
land flooded by a public waterbody under the pre-existing Lucas
title limitation doctrine. 110 Iowa's Supreme Court used a similar
analysis to hold that state legislation protecting Indian mounds
on private property precluded a takings claim."' Nevada has
held that regulatory delays in development approvals in the Lake
Tahoe Basin are not a taking because the developer had notice of a
complex regulatory process and the protection of the Tahoe Basin
would benefit the developer when his property was granted devel-
opment approval." 2 Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court recently
held that moratoria tailored to the complexity of the regulatory
process are not a temporary taking. 1 3
The fear of being held liable for an unconstitutional taking
has led many jurisdictions to experiment with substitute forms of
compensation for land owners whose property is subject to regula-
tion, such as transferable development rights (TDRs), as well as
the direct purchase of development rights through general reve-
nues and bond issues. 114 These have long been promoted as a sub-
stitute for direct compensation, but it is not clear that they will
fulfill their potential because it is often difficult to anchor those
units on another tract.11"5 A recent extension of the idea contem-
plates the creation of wetland mitigation banks, which will hold
entitlements until they are needed by developers to offset the de-
struction of a wetland. 1 6 TDRs were originally developed to pre-
serve urban landmarks, but the idea has been extended to the
109. Id. at 1001.
110. Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312, 1315-16 (Mass. 1994); see also
Nemeth v. Abonmarche Corp., 576 N.W.2d 641 (Mich. 1998).
111. Hunizker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Iowa 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1003 (1995).
112. Kelly v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 855 P.2d 1027, 1035 (Nev. 1993).
113. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 341-43 (2002).
114. See Dwight H. Merriam, Reeingneering Regulation to Avoid Takings, 1 URB.
LAW. 33, 33-35 (2001).
115. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE § 12.13 (2d ed., 1988). An early TDR
scheme was invalidated because it vested too much discretion in the local government
to designate receiving parcels. See also Montgomery County Citizens' Ass'n v. Md.
Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 522 A.2d 1328 (Md. 1987).
116. A developer restores or creates a new wetland and sells it to a developer who
needs to mitigate the destruction of a wetland in connection with a development pro-
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preservation of environmentally sensitive land. The most impor-
tant environmental protection experiment involving TDRs is the
one currently in place in the Pinelands of New Jersey. Pineland
development credits are created based on the development expec-
tations of severely restricted lands. The scheme has been upheld
by the New Jersey Supreme Court1 17 and endorsed by the Court
in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York118 .
In a recent taking challenge to the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency's denial of a permit to build a house on a one-half acre lot
because it was located in a stream environment zone, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was no taking, in part,
because the lot owner was given TDRs." 9 The Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit's lack of ripeness holding and expressly refused to
decide whether "TDRs may be considered in deciding the issue
whether there is a taking as opposed to the issue of whether just
compensation has been afforded for such a taking."1 20 However,
three concurring justices argued that TDRs were not relevant to
the first issue because they would lead to under-compensation.
Conclusion
Watershed management provides an opportunity for local
governments to play a central role in the conservation of biodiver-
sity and the promotion of environmentally sustainable develop-
ment. As the primary stewards of the nation's private lands, local
governments can use their land use authority to curb activities
involving the degradation of stream corridors and other sensitive
lands. Local government regulation, however, can never address
all of the causes of watershed degradation. The local role should,
instead, be exercised in partnerships with other units of govern-
ment-both vertically and horizontally-and the major stakehold-
ers in the watershed, including the primary resource use groups.
To play an effective role, local governments must do three things.
First, they must base their regulatory and planning decisions on
scientific information to the maximum extent possible. Second,
they must devise creative strategies to assemble the necessary
ject. See Royal Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banks,
and Takings, 81 IOWA L. REV. 527 (1996).
117. Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251, 264 (N.J. 1991); see also
Glisson v. Alachua City, 558 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
118. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
119. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1996),
rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 725 (1997).
120. Id. at 728.
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land reserves and buffer areas. Third, they must use the full ex-
tent of their existing land use authority to fill gaps left by federal
and state environmental legislation.
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